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A ROLE FOR PEIRCE’S CATEGORIES?
H.G. Callaway
This book arose from the author’s recent dissertation written under the Gerhard Schnrich at Munich. 
It focuses on Peirce’s theory of categories and his epistemology. According to Baltzer, what is 
distinctive in Peirce’s theory of knowledge is that he reconstrues objects as “knots in networks of rela-
tions.” The phrase may ring a bell. It suggests a structuralist interpretation of Peirce, influenced by the 
Munich environs. The study aims to shows how Peirce’s theory of categories supports his theory of 
knowledge and how “question concerning a priori structures of knowledge” are transformed within 
this relational framework. A chief critical target is David Savan’s semiotics, specifically the idea that 
“the multiplicity of development of the categories” is “conditioned by nothing but the indefiniteness of 
the categories.”1 But in contrast with this, if there is any indefiniteness in the categories, they cannot 
fully direct their own application, and this is to say regarding them “that our knowledge is never abso-
lute but always swims, as it were, in a continuum...”2 If the doctrine of continuity applies to the cate-
gories, they also have a continuum to swim in.
The books gives considerable attention to the relationship between Peirce’s theory of 
categories and its precursor in Kant. The Introduction opens with this quote: “Now upon the table of 
categories philosophy is erected,not merely metaphysic but the philosophy of religion, of morals, of 
law, and of every science.”3 A concern with foundationalist theme marks the central thesis of the 
work.. “It is my task in the present book to demonstrate [a]...dependence relationship,” says Baltzer. 
This is a dependence of semiotic upon the theory of categories. “It is not, as Savan4 would have us 
believe, that signs ground the categories. Instead it is much more the categories which are the 
foundational element, having their (most prominent) expression in the triad of signs.”5 The claim is 
perhaps overly strong. Given Peircean fallibilism, we may wonder if sufficient stress has been placed 
upon the reciprocal or mutual dependence between the theory of categories and the theory of signs and 
predicates. Baltzer’s thesis requires comparison with Elisabeth Walter’s, in her Introduction to the 
German edition of the Lectures on Pragmatism: “Since, however, everything at all which can be said 
or thought is said in signs, they are the foundation of every other domain.”6
The book consists of an Introduction, three major divisions consisting of a total of 18 
numbered chapters, and a brief concluding Overview or Prospect. Beyond the main text, there is also a 
listing of abbreviations, a bibliography, and an index of personal names. The strength of this book is 
the elaboration of the author’s themes through discussions of substantial portions of Peirce’s work and 
the secondary literature. This could help to open the discussion of Peirce to wider audiences. If there is 
a weakness, it is a narrowness on alternative interpretations of fundamental Peircean ideas.
Part I, “The Design of the Theory of Categories in the ‘New List’ ” concentrates on Peirce’s 
early development of the theory of categories, starting with an exposition, in the first two chapters, of 
Kant’s theory of categories and Peirce’s departures from Kant. There follows an initial exposition of 
the Peircean theory, including the start of an interesting emphasis on the idea of levels of analysis in 
the application of the categories. Part II, “Distinctive Features of the Ramified [ausdifferenzierten] 
Theory of the Categories,” looks at the Peircean categories more systematically, including 
consideration of the value and interrelations of the various definitions Peirce gives to the three 
categories, the irreducibility theses, the question of the completeness of the categories, and the func-
tions of the distinction between genuine and degenerative cases. Part III concentrates on Peirce’s later 
“phenomenological” elaboration of his theory, where the categories are brought into closest con-
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2nection with the epistemological themes of grounds for knowledge and their relational character. 
Overall this book is a thorough and rigorous treatment of the topic from a somewhat Kantian, and
structuralist point of view. It provides an expository basis for discussions of structuralist vs. anti-
structuralist and foundationalist vs. anti-foundationalist interpretations of Peirce’s work, especially for 
the German literature, suggesting significant relationships between Kantian and structuralist themes. 
In the present review, I briefly sketch the author’s approach while suggesting an alternative 
perspective.
1. Relational Structure
“It will be shown,” argues the Introduction, “that Peirce assumes, for each relatumwhether mental 
act, state of affairs, or object of the physical worldthat it is representable as a more or less complex 
relational structure and that this constitutes its essential character.”7 Objects in their “essential charac-
ter” are analyzable into relations. The interpretive claim is used in an account of the multiplicity of 
Peircean applications. Because each relation is to be brought back to a categorical model, the ubiquity 
and variety of the categories would be explained as the various forms of appearance of differently 
structured relational complexes. Such a process of reconstruction of a state of affairs by means of rela-
tional structures is to be called a “categorical ordering” (kategorische Verortung). A central concern of 
this work is to analyze Peirce’s theory of categories in terms of categorical ordering as the basic 
principle of understanding.8 The term “categorical ordering,” and the relationship of this to Baltzer’s 
theme of levels of analysis involve some innovation and an especially valuable points in the inter-
pretation. (See CP5.223 for a related Peircean discussion.) The idea of relational structure as essential 
is more problematic.
“From the fact that the categories are fundamental elements of knowing, there follows a 
particular conception of the knowable object.”9 “Categorically structured knowledge,” argues Baltzer, 
“cannot do without reference to further objects in the construction of the object of knowledge.” That 
is, categorically structured knowledge “necessarily involves the reference or relation of one object to 
another, because the categories only structure such relations among objects.” Thus, “the objects in 
question are always only determined [bestimmt] relative to the relation.” Citing Peirce in Volume II of 
Kloesel and Pape’s Semiotische Schriften, the author urges that “in Peircean context, the external 
reference or relations [externe Bezug] of an element are of central interest and not its internal 
construction.”10
Insofar as these interpretive points reflect Peirce’s deep and thorough-going emphasis upon 
the logic of relations, they stands beyond reasonable question. For example, “Peirce attempts to show 
the superiority of organization in terms of types of valences or connections over sortings in terms of 
internal characteristics, by means of the analogy with the periodic table.”11 But the contrast put 
forward between relational or structural characterizations and characterizations in terms of “internal 
construction” is problematic.
In the first place, Peirce’s logic of relations clearly encompasses traditional subject-predicate 
logic by including monadic predicates. So, holding as he does, with reference to chemistry, that the 
valences or types of connectivity of the elements are crucial in the period table, this would not forbid 
consideration of differences between elements of the same valence and nor would it forbid application 
of monadic predicates in the details of classification or individuation. Baltzer urges that according to 
Peirce, “it is not in terms of internal characteristics that we can deduce law-like generalizations in 
chemistry, but instead only (simply? [lediglich]) on the basis of external connections to other 
elements.”12 The proper Peircean point is surely that seeing things in terms of their relations is crucial 
to understanding them.
But this does not show that we need never consider “internal characteristics,” on Peirce’s 
account. In fact the chemical theory of valences came to a further explanation by reference to atomic 
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3number and correlated shells of electrons. Knowing the atomic number of an element one can deduce, 
in chemical theory, the number of electrons in each shell and thus its valence. Would this show that 
monadic predicates, e.g., ‘x has-the-atomic-number-79’ and “internal characteristics, inside the atom” 
are really the only considerations of importance? It seems not. But this is just to repeat the point that 
the author’s distinction between “relational structure” and “internal characteristics” is not clearly 
suited to make the kind of point he seems to want to make. What is missing is emphasis upon the ways 
that elements themselves may be better understood in virtue of seeing them in terms of their relations. 
“Internal character,” may be revealed or more deeply probed, by thorough consideration of the full 
range of relations.
According to Baltzer, “Peirce’s conception of the categories constitutes the central core of a 
theory of knowledge which conceives of the objects of knowledge as the limit-value of an unending 
series of conclusions.” The point implicitly relies upon Peirce’s conceptions of truth and inquiry and 
their relationship to the infinite community of inquiry. In support of the idea of objects as the “limit-
value” of an unending series of conclusions, appeal is made to the 1868 Journal of Speculative 
Philosophy Series. The Peircean point that “There is no immediate intuitive knowledge of states of 
affairs,”13 is, then, equated with the conception of objects of knowledge as the “limit-value of an 
unending series.” 
Presumably, if our relational reconstruction or analysis is never finished, we can only know 
objects “as they appear,” i.e., as relational complexes, and we would only know the “object itself” if 
the limit-value were to be reached. Baltzer’s Peirce seems very Kantian. This impression is reinforced 
by his juxtaposition of Peirce on indeterminacy of objects and vagueness, with a discussion of Peirce 
on the “absolute individual.”14 Following Peirce (CP 3.93), the author argues that “An absolute 
individual can neither be thought nor perceived. It can not be perceived, because each of our senses 
only covers a partial domain of perception, so that many aspects of the perceived are not determined.” 
Further the absolute individual cannot be thought, “because its determination in thought presupposes 
the definition of all conceivable, i.e., infinitely many predicates.”15 The problem is that Peirce’s 
discussion is plausibly seen as grounds for rejecting anything very similar to Baltzer’s quasi-Kantian 
distinction between relational structure and internal structure. Or, to put the point in a slightly different 
way, we need not know everything about an object in order to know anything about an object. 
Peirce takes a similar stance on this issue when he says, in his review of Frazer’s edition of 
Berkeley’s works, that for many questions, the final agreement is already reached.”16 The point is 
expanded on in Peirce’s draft review of Royce (c. 1885).
...upon innumerable questions, we have already reached the final opinion. How do we know that? Do we 
fancy ourselves infallible? Not at all; but throwing off as probably erroneous a thousandth or even a 
hundredth of all the beliefs established beyond present doubt, there must remain a vast multitude in which 
the final opinion has been reached.17
Neither infallibility nor complete knowledge is required in order to know something about 
particular objects or domains of objects. Maintaining this point is crucial if we are to make the 
Peircean distinction between what is problematic and what is not problematic, in avoiding versions of 
ontological agnosticism, and in the Peircean rejection of the Kantian “thing-in-itself.” 
2. Irreducibility of the Categories
According to Baltzer, the foundational function of the categories “is to be grasped in the domain of 
philosophical semiotic.” His argument for this is partly that the “sign is a paradigm for one of the three 
categories.” But he seems not to allow for a dependence of the theory of categories on semiotic. 
Clearly, for Peirce the categories are metaphysical notions which play a methodological role in 
inquiry. It would be an error to view them as absolutely a priori instead of being epistemically sup-
ported via fruitful applications. For example, if we found no compelling application for triadic rela-
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4tions, in results of semantic inquiry, this would call the category of Thirdness into question. The point 
can be illustrated by reference to Baltzer on the irreducibility of triadic relations.
This theme is central in the second Part of the book, running through two chapters on “The Strict 
Conception of the Irreducibility Proof,” and “The Broad Conception of the Irreducibility Proof.” The 
distinction depends on the point that aspects of the thesis of the irreducibility of Thirdness are built 
into the logical system which Peirce makes use of in the strict proof. Thus Baltzer uses a broader 
conception of the Peircean proof as the context appropriate for evaluating presuppositions of the 
“strict” proof.
Though it is possible to express what could be said using three-placed predicates by means of two-
placed predicates, in the standard predicate logic, this is accomplished by means of a bound variable 
with three occurrences within the analysis, something that Peirce’s system does not allow. In Peirce’s 
system, this use of the bound variable would be replaced by the explicitly three-placed relation of 
“teridentity.”18 To put the point in another way, thinking of Thirdness as a matter of plurality beyond 
two, the standard predicate logic confirms Peirce’s emphasis upon plurality, since it implicitly allows 
identity between any number of elements of a domain, via the cross-reference of bound variables. But 
obviously, it does not favor 1, 2, and 3, in quite the way that Peirce does. I suspect that there is a question 
here about the usefulness of the standard predicate calculus in cases, where we are less confident of our 
understand of particular relational notions. 
A similar point arises in discussion of the broad conception of the irreducibility proof.19 Though 
chiefly drawing on Peirce’s reaction to the work of A. B. Kempe,20 and replying to Christopherson 
and Johnstone’s “Triadicity and Thirdness,”21 the argument also casts a critical light on Quine’s 
“Reduction to A Dyadic Predicate.”22 The idea involves the analysis of three-placed relations or 
rhemata as ordered triples. The Peircean paradigm of ‘A gives B to C’ <A, B, C> can then be analyzed 
in terms of orders pairs, either <A, <B, C>> or <<A, B>, C>. Thus, “the triple is dissolved into an 
ordered pair of an element and an ordered pair, and this, on first sight, seems not to presuppose any 
element of Thirdness.”23 Baltzer objects as follows:
As against the situation at the start which works directly with the three indices A, B, and C, the 
representation with the help of ordered pairs requires the creation of an ens rationis, namely the ordered 
pair of B and C or of A and B. The result thus combines, in either case, an ens rationis and an index. This 
shows that in such a method of representation, we cannot do without Thirdness in an adequate analysis of 
the state of affairs.24
The reduction would only go through, if one allows both that an ordered triple can be analyzed in 
terms of ordered pairs, and that the further analysis of ordered pairs into two elements is not relevant 
to the irreducibility thesis. But Baltzer objects that this is “not an adequate analysis of the state of af-
fairs.” In Peirce’s words, replying to Kempe, “The diagram fails to afford any formal representation of 
the manner in which this abstract idea (or ens rationis) is derived from the concrete ideas.”25 Thus, the 
irreducibility thesis seems to rest on an semiotic anti-nominalism on what is to count as “adequate 
analyses” of states of affairs. Yet this threatens to beg the question in favor of Thirdness, unless we are 
able to appeal to an independent assessment of the value of results in applications. This point allows a 
guiding function for the categories in inquiry. But it suggests that a guiding function or “fallibilistic 
foundation” (“a tarmac on the road of inquiry,” in a phrase once suggested to me by Cathy Legg), is 
subject to a holist assessment in light of the fruitfulness of its applications; the categories cannot fully 
determine either what to count as fruitful results or their own ultimate validity. The suggestion is, then, 
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5that the standard predicate logic is better suited as a “logic of inquiry,” (or logic of research) as contrasted 
with a logic suited to the statement of established results of science or inquiry. Peirce’s logic can be un-
derstood to suppose that (paradigmatic) triadic relations will never be adequately analyzed in lower terms, 
and that we will never need any relational predicates of n-places, (n>3) which cannot be adequately 
analyzed, or explained by use of predicates of 1, 2, or 3 places. I suspect that the devil is in the details 
here, since “adequate analysis” is something we may only achieve after prolonged inquiry. Nor should we 
suppose that such inquiry will remain unaffected by empirical developments.
3. The Structure of Firstness
Fallibility is a persistent theme in Peirce, just as Firstness and chance are persistent themes. Thus 
whatever the foundational element we may find in his work, it must be subjected to a fallibilist 
therapy. I emphasize this theme, though it is somewhat external to Baltzer’s approach in his book, 
because it is especially worthy of attention at present.
Baltzer’s treatment of Firstness is particularly illuminating. For Firstness seems to most resist 
formal definition or any formalistic interpretation. The unexpected, that which breaks down our pre-
conceptions and constrains our reconstructions, is to be expected in the world that Peirce envisages, 
and if the category of Firstness did not allow of a certain vagueness, and resistance to a priori or struc-
turalist treatments, then it is difficult to see how there would be any plausibility at all in the view of 
Peirce as an “evolutionary realist.”26 Yet in his discussion of the expressions or developments 
(AusprÅgungen) of Firstness,27 Baltzer disputes the idea that “Peirce’s categories are at once formal 
and material concepts.”28 This contrasts with Peirce who equates “Firstnesses,” with positive internal 
properties of the object in itself.”29 This point relates to the author’s closing acknowledgment of the 
need for further work on Peirce’s concept of reality in connection with the categories. “In regard to 
Peirce’s conception of the structured character of all knowledge, states of affairs, and things of the 
physical world,...the concept of reality possess quite obviously a fundamental (foundational?) charac-
ter.”30 In his scholarly and clearly written work, Baltzer thus prepares the way for further discussions 
in the German literature and beyond.
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